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Book Review
Martha Chamallas and Jennifer B. Wriggins, The Measure of Injury: Race, Gender, 
and Tort Law. New York: New York University Press, 2010, pp. 228, $40.00.
Reviewed by Anne Bloom and Julie Davies
The subject of torts is a perennial favorite for first-year law students. The 
cases are fun to read and practically cry out for discussion of the broader 
social and political considerations at stake. But despite the easy connection 
between torts and public policy, the field is relatively under-analyzed from the 
perspective of gender and race. The pioneering work of Martha Chamallas 
(gender) and Jennifer Wriggins (race) is a welcome exception. 
Some years ago, Chamallas argued (with the historian Linda Kerber) in a 
now iconic work that tort law undervalues the kinds of injuries that are more 
commonly experienced by women.1 More recently, Jennifer Wriggins followed 
in Chamallas’ tracks to make similar arguments in the context of race.2 Both 
works were almost startling in the clarity of the analysis and led to important 
changes in the law. 
The Measure of Injury brings the analytical power of Chamallas and Wriggins 
together in a comprehensive exploration of gender and racial biases in tort law. 
Like their earlier work, The Measure of Injury is beautifully written. It lays out the 
basic concepts of tort law in simple terms that even a layperson (or first-year 
torts student) could easily follow. It then draws upon literally hundreds of 
cases to powerfully illustrate how these principles have played out in tort law 
in ways that are, as the book jacket promises, “anything but gender and race 
neutral.”
The book’s major contribution is to expose how tort law under-compensates 
the injuries of women and minorities. Because discrimination in tort law is (for 
the most part) no longer overt, the authors rely upon detailed historical analyses 
and close examinations of contemporary rules to make their arguments. Much 
1. Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 
88 Mich. L. Rev. 814 (1990).
2. Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and Remedies, 1865–
2007, 27 Rev. Litig. 37, 53–57 (2007).
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of this work involves untangling the ways in which old biases continue to be 
perpetrated in today’s seemingly neutral practices. The result is an extremely 
sophisticated work of historical and legal analysis that is so well-written that 
first-year law students could use it as a supplement to their casebook.
The straightforward organization of the book facilitates its broad appeal. 
Two introductory chapters explain the authors’ theoretical approach to the 
material and provide historical background on the key themes. The remainder 
of the book is then organized around the standard topics of a first-year torts 
class: intentional torts, negligence, causation, and damages.
As the authors explain in Chapter 1, their approach to tort law is heavily 
influenced by critical theory. For those who are not familiar with critical theory, 
Chapter 1 provides a particularly clear explanation of how critical theory differs 
from the “law and economics” and “corrective justice” approaches animating 
most torts scholarship today. Readers not particularly interested in theory, 
or already well-versed in critical theory, may want to skip this chapter. The 
authors provide a nice overview of the key theoretical points in the introductory 
paragraphs of subsequent chapters and the main points of the book can be 
gleaned without delving too deeply into the authors’ theoretical lens.
Chapter 2 sets out what the authors refer to as the “historical frames” of 
the book. Although it might be tempting to gloss over this chapter as well, 
we recommend against it. The historical overview provides a very useful 
backdrop for the analysis that follows and, in any event, the details are just 
too fascinating to miss. The analysis of 19th century claims for “criminal 
conversation” (or adultery), for example, provides interesting insight on a 
mindset that continues to drive many tort cases today.
Although it seems like a claim for adultery might be available to either 
spouse alleging injury, 19th century judges restricted criminal conversation 
claims to men. The injury they recognized was not so much emotional distress 
as loss of the husband’s right of exclusive sexual access to his wife. According 
to the authors, wives could not bring this claim because 19th century courts 
believed that women “lost nothing of permanent value” when their husbands 
committed adultery (39). Moreover, the “prevailing norm was that a wife 
should ordinarily forgive her husband when he committed adultery” (39).
It is tempting to dismiss these sorts of views as relics of the ancient past. 
But Chamallas and Wriggins link the cavalier attitude that 19th century judges 
displayed toward women’s injuries in criminal conversation cases to a much 
longer history of tort law turning a blind eye to injuries involving women 
and minorities. Their recounting of emotional distress claims litigated over a 
century later, for example, involves similar themes.
Chamallas and Wriggins explain that courts in early “nervous shock” 
cases refused to grant recovery to women who alleged that a defendant’s 
conduct caused them to suffer a miscarriage or stillbirth. As “nervous shock” 
cases evolved into claims for emotional distress, some courts began to allow 
recovery but only for white women. For these courts, however, only white 
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women were regarded as sufficiently “fragile, delicate, [and] timid” to merit 
a court’s protection (48). African American women were viewed as “stoic and 
impervious to pain” (48).
The authors’ analysis of the outcomes in wrongful death cases reveals a 
similar bias, with both the race and the gender of victims significantly affecting 
both the possibility and the amount of recovery. In all of these examples, the 
authors expose courts’ relative indifference to the kinds of injuries suffered by 
women and minorities. As subsequent chapters make clear, we still live with 
the legacy of that bias, though in many instances the origins have been lost to 
us. Chapter 2 reminds us of this history and does an excellent job of framing 
the rest of the book.
Chapters 3 through 6 tackle the key doctrinal areas of torts. Each of 
these chapters begins with a remarkably clear summary of the relevant legal 
principles and a quick reminder of the book’s theoretical and historical 
premises. The authors then draw upon an extremely rich trove of cases to 
analyze how doctrine intersects with gender and race in each substantive area.
Chapter 3 focuses on intentional torts and emphasizes the under-
compensation of two types of intentional torts that are of particular interest to 
women and minorities: domestic violence and workplace harassment claims. 
The authors note that relatively few tort claims are brought in these areas and 
that those claims that are brought rarely succeed. They then set out to explain 
why this is the case. Although their explanations differ in the particulars, the 
overall message is the same: Current legal practices discourage the bringing of 
tort claims that involve domestic violence and workplace harassment.
In the case of domestic violence, the authors link contemporary practices 
to the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity, which precluded the bringing of 
tort claims for domestic violence until well into the 1990s. One of the key 
rationales for the doctrine was the concern that family members would collude 
to bring fraudulent claims. Over time, however, support for the doctrine was 
eroded by the realization that it was not necessary to ban claims to prevent 
fraud. When the doctrine was abolished, the number of claims should have 
increased. The expected uptick, however, did not occur. Why not?
The authors make a convincing case that tort claims for domestic violence 
claims are not brought today for many of the same reasons that claims were 
barred under the doctrine of interspousal immunity. As they explain, even 
though the doctrine has been abolished, it lives on in the form of “family 
member exclusion” clauses to homeowners’ insurance policies. “Family 
member exclusion” clauses began to appear in insurance contracts around 
the same time that the interspousal immunity doctrine was abolished. The 
rationale for including those clauses was the same one offered for the doctrine 
of interspousal immunity, i.e., concerns about collusion and fraud.
As the authors also note, however, even if “family member exclusion” clauses 
are removed from insurance policies, it would still be difficult for victims 
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of domestic violence to sue in tort. This is because domestic violence is an 
intentional tort and liability insurance is rarely available for intentional torts. 
As a practical matter, the lack of liability insurance acts as a significant barrier 
to the bringing of all intentional tort claims. And, in the everyday practice of 
law, the availability of insurance is a key consideration in a lawyer’s evaluation 
of a plaintiff’s case. Without liability insurance, there is no deep pocket and 
would-be plaintiffs are likely to have difficulty finding a lawyer to represent 
them even when they have very strong claims.
The authors’ explanation for why there are so few tort claims for workplace 
harassment makes a similar point but focuses on the actions of courts. The 
authors note that, although workplace harassment usually gives rise to an 
independent tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, many 
courts bar plaintiffs from bringing tort claims for workplace harassment when 
another remedy exists. Since, in most instances, another claim does exist under 
local or federal civil rights law, the tort claim is effectively precluded.
Unfortunately, the fix is not as simple as overcoming the preclusion argument. 
This is because many courts allow workplace harassment claims in principle 
but deny them in practice. As was the case with “criminal conversation” claims 
on behalf of women in the 19th century, many contemporary courts simply do 
not consider workplace harassment to be that serious, even when it involves 
almost constant degradation. Indeed, the authors provide many chilling 
examples of courts dismissing workplace harassment claims as not sufficiently 
“outrageous” to qualify as a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.
The authors conclude that the paucity of domestic violence and workplace 
harassment claims in tort law stems from a devaluing of the types of injuries 
that women and minorities are most likely to experience. While domestic 
violence and workplace harassment are now legally recognized as intentional 
torts, procedural and practical barriers make it extremely difficult for women 
and minorities to successfully bring claims. In the end, it is as if law barred the 
claims directly, as they did several years ago.
Chapter 4 covers negligence law. Among other things, the chapter 
emphasizes the role of physical harm in negligence law and shows how this 
emphasis has (once again) led to under-compensating the types of injuries for 
which women and minorities are most likely to seek recovery. Here again, tort 
law does not explicitly discriminate against women and minorities but, rather, 
refuses to recognize their injuries as presenting cognizable claims. Indeed, one 
of the things this chapter does particularly well is to point out the arbitrary 
and ridiculous distinctions courts have used to deny recovery in emotional 
harm and relational loss cases.
One example is the distinction that tort law draws between physical and 
mental harm. Courts are often suspicious of claims for emotional injury unless 
the claims are accompanied by evidence of physical harm. And some of the 
legal standards in negligence continue to treat physical and mental disabilities 
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as if they were wholly separate. But the more we learn about the science of 
the body, the more overwhelming the evidence becomes of the connection 
between the mind and body. And, as the evidence mounts, the more ridiculous 
the legal distinctions between physical and mental disability become.
Chapter 4 also pays special attention to the complex issues raised in cases 
involving sexual exploitation and reproduction. One of the authors’ key points 
is that courts are not taking sufficient account of the gender and racial aspects 
of these cases. As an example, the authors describe a 1993 Texas case involving 
a nineteen-year old woman whose boyfriend secretly videotaped them having 
sex and circulated the video without her knowledge or permission (97). A jury 
awarded the plaintiff damages on a claim for emotional distress but the Texas 
Supreme Court reversed, on the ground that the relationship between the 
plaintiff and her boyfriend was not sufficient to create a duty.
As Chamallas and Wriggins explain, the court’s reasoning denies the 
gendered aspects of the case. While it is theoretically possible that men and 
women would react similarly in a case like this, historically, the position of men 
and women has, in fact, been quite different, particularly in matters relating 
to sex. This historical context does matter in terms of the emotional harm that 
the victim is likely to experience and should matter for purposes of stating 
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Among other things, 
the authors emphasize that the courts should have recognized that a female 
victim of sexual exploitation is more likely to experience sexual harassment 
and a serious erosion of control over her own sexuality (98–99). Because of the 
foreseeability of this harm, “a duty of care should have been triggered” (99).
Cases involving reproduction receive a similarly complex analysis. As a 
general matter, the authors argue that negligence law implicitly values property 
rights more than relational rights. For example, the courts consistently 
undervalue childbearing and childrearing.
The authors make a particularly useful comparison between cases involving 
deprivations of reproductive rights and cases involving injury from coerced 
sterilizations, which usually involve African American women. As in the 19th 
century “criminal conversation” cases, the courts hearing coerced sterilization 
cases seem especially indifferent to the injuries involving the reproductive 
interests and suffering of minority women.
As an example of this indifference, the authors quote one court as saying 
that forced sterilization was not harmful to the African American plaintiff 
“because it did not cause any additional physical, pain, injury or illness” than 
the plaintiff was already experiencing from a different medical procedure (110). 
The court also emphasized that the plaintiff had “three prior children born out 
of wedlock” (109) and three more children after marriage. For those reasons, 
the court concluded, “the fact that she was not able to have a seventh child 
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after previously giving birth to six children is hardly something which would 
offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity” (110). 
Chapter 5 addresses causation issues. And once again, the authors present a 
fascinating contrast—this time in the context of wrongful birth and lead paint 
cases. With respect to wrongful birth cases, the authors trace the evolution 
of courts from focusing on the actions of the mother to the actions of the 
physician. As changing social views made it easier to see reproduction as a 
choice, courts found it easier to focus less on the actions of the mother and 
began to find physicians liable when something went wrong. 
A similar evolution has not occurred, however, in lead paint cases. Lead is 
well known to produce severe cognitive difficulties, but establishing causality 
for cognitive impairment in a particular child is problematic. As the authors 
explain, in attempting to resolve the causation issues, courts sometimes order 
parents and family members to undergo IQ testing and allow defendants 
to discover the mother’s educational records. One memorable quote from a 
lawyer for the lead paint industry explained the rationale for these practices as 
“relevant” to the question of whether the children alleging injury in lead paint 
cases are “home listening to Shakespeare” or “in front of a video game eight 
hours of the day” (143).
As these quotes make clear, and in contrast to wrongful birth cases, causation 
questions in lead paint cases continue to focus on the mother. This is so even 
though it is well known that lead paint causes the very cognitive conditions 
about which the plaintiffs complain. Indeed, the evidence against the lead 
paint industry is much stronger than the evidence against doctors in most 
wrongful birth cases. Nevertheless, there is an underlying suspicion in lead 
paint cases that the mother may be responsible for the child’s injuries. 
Chamallas and Wriggins also show how causal analyses in lead paint cases 
are influenced by racial biases about the role of inheritance in intelligence. As 
they point out, parental IQ tests and similar measures are not especially useful 
for predicting the intelligence of any particular child. But courts and defense 
counsel overestimate the relevance of such tests because of pre-existing biases 
they hold about minorities. This not only makes lead paint cases more difficult 
to prove but also discourages families from bringing such claims for fear of 
humiliation.
Much more broadly, the authors suggest that biases affect causal judgments 
across the board in tort litigation. Drawing on insights from cognitive 
psychology, Chamallas and Wriggins make a powerful case that even experts 
are influenced by a “normality bias” that makes them more likely to see 
something that they expect to see (127). The existence of this bias compromises 
the objectivity of witnesses, including experts, and pervades the thinking of 
judges and juries. They are prone to believe that injury or hardship naturally 
accompany the plaintiff’s socioeconomic status, gender, or race. As illustrated 
so well by the wrongful birth and lead paint cases, gender and racial biases 
enter into cases in ways that may be difficult to detect.
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Chamallas and Wriggins do not say that causal analysis in tort litigation is 
completely broken. But their arguments raise a number of important questions 
about current practices. Tackling the implications of this extremely important 
chapter could (and should) occupy a small legion of law professors willing to 
take on the task of reconstruction.
 For different reasons, the chapter on damages also deserves a great deal 
of attention. As in the other chapters, the authors begin with an overview 
of how damages law is employed in tort litigation. The authors then offer 
an avalanche of data to show how women and minorities are grossly under-
compensated. The evidence is so overwhelming that there is really no room 
for argument. Tort law has some work to do before women and minorities are 
compensated fairly for their injuries.
Fortunately, Chamallas and Wriggins also propose a fix. Using examples 
drawn from cases and the distribution of the federal September 11 Victim 
Compensation Fund, they urge courts to refuse to allow race and gender to 
play a role in the setting of awards. The simple way to do this is to refuse to use 
tables that reflect past discrimination. Instead, the authors recommend the use 
of “blended tables representing the composite experiences of men and women 
of diverse races” (170). It is very difficult to argue with this recommendation 
and seems likely that future courts will rely upon this chapter to make the very 
changes that the authors propose.
Another interesting argument made in this chapter has to do with the impact 
of recent tort reforms on the recoveries of women and minority plaintiffs. The 
authors point out that the popular caps on non-economic damages promoted 
by tort reformers reinforce the notion that property (or economic) harm is 
more important than relational harm. As the authors explain, because women 
and minorities are most likely to have claims that cannot be expressed in 
economic terms, the caps affect them disproportionately, with the effect of 
further reducing already limited recoveries. 
The point is an interesting one but it should be noted that these caps are 
hard on everyone. Anyone who must rely on the tort system to get money 
for medical care or other needs following an injury is hurt by the caps. The 
application of caps in certain types of cases, such as medical malpractice, 
distorts tort litigation and makes it infeasible to litigate cases where there 
has been real injury. Perhaps the arguments made here, however, will attract 
attention from civil rights advocates who, for the most part, have steered clear 
of the tort reform wars. 
The six substantive chapters of the book are followed by a very brief 
conclusion. In this final chapter, the authors set out several broad proposals 
for reform. The first is a general argument in favor of more aggressive 
incorporation of civil rights norms into tort law. This seems harmless enough 
as a general proposition but we suspect that the application may be more 
challenging than the authors anticipate.
Book Review: The Measure of Injury
502	 Journal of Legal Education
Many practitioners go to great pains to keep civil rights and tort claims 
separate for jurisdictional and other strategic reasons (such as avoiding 
preemption and other types of arguments which defendants routinely employ 
to avoid or delay liability). Moreover, there is reason to be wary of merging torts 
and civil rights law, particularly in the intentional torts realm. In Section 1983 
law, the U.S. Supreme Court has become persuaded that civil rights law and 
tort law are indistinguishable, with troubling effects. Among other things, this 
development has led to limitations on duty and on insistence of compensatory 
tort damages, with the effect of eroding protection for constitutional rights.3 
The authors also want to make it easier to bring tort claims for domestic 
violence and harassment. Since the absence of liability insurance seems to be a 
key reason why lawyers are reluctant to bring tort claims for domestic violence, 
the authors suggest the expansion of homeowners’ liability coverage as one 
potential solution. If the insurance industry was encouraged to develop a 
product that covers this type of injury, the authors believe they would respond 
by doing so.
We agree that the expansion of liability coverage would be beneficial to 
domestic violence survivors trying to start a new life. But it may not be a good 
idea generally to allow people to self-insure for acts of their own aggression or 
intentional torts. Should a risk pool in which all purchasers of homeowners 
insurance are members be required to bear the costs of other people’s 
violence? And if insurance products are offered to cover domestic violence, 
will it ultimately expand to include all intentional torts?
Another proposal recommends that freedom from sexual harassment and 
reproductive rights be treated as “special interests that trigger a duty of care in 
negligence law” (189). The idea here is to make it easier for sexual harassment 
victims and women with reproduction-related injuries to sue. One of the key 
points that the authors make in this section is that the U.S. legal system is 
culturally and legally unreceptive to these types of claims. In contrast, we 
note that other legal systems are much more receptive to dignitary harms that 
affect social relationships. The law of slander in Ghana and the civil law in 
countries like France and Austria, to give a few examples, are very receptive 
to claims that protect the tranquility of social groups. Broader acceptance of 
similar concepts in the U.S. would provide greater protection to women and 
minorities.
3. See e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(invoking tort limitations on affirmative duty to affirm dismissal of a due process claim 
brought against the department of social services after it failed to remove a child from 
an abusive household); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (stressing that Section 1983 
damages are ordinarily to be governed by tort rules of damages, and holding that “the basic 
purpose of a Section 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries 
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”). 
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Finally, we note that there are some aspects of gender and sex-based bias 
that the book simply does not address, like the treatment of transsexuals and 
intersex populations in tort law. But no book can cover everything and The 
Measure of Injury already covers an astonishing array of topics that are often 
ignored in tort law. As the first comprehensive examination of gender and 
race bias in tort law, the book makes a huge contribution to the field. There is 
more ground to cover, of course, and hopefully other scholars will continue to 
develop analyses of tort law along these lines. 
As we noted at the outset, one of the great pleasures of the book is that it 
combines complex analysis with a high degree of readability. But could you 
really use The Measure of Injury as a supplement in a first-year torts class? As 
tort professors with a couple of decades of teaching experience between us, 
we think the answer is yes. Indeed, we would like to especially recommend 
particular chapters that provide extremely helpful explanations of complex 
subjects that commonly pose problems for students.
One of the most challenging areas of tort law for most first-year students, 
for example, is causation. Although the basic concepts are relatively simple, 
students stumble as they apply principles to actual cases. In our view, the 
causation chapter and especially the discussion of the lead paint litigation 
could be very useful for first-year students who struggle to understand the 
concepts of causation. We also believe that first-year students would benefit 
from reading Chapter 2, which places tort law principles in a broader historical 
context.
The book is also appropriate for more advanced courses, like Advanced 
Torts, and courses that focus on legal issues affecting women and minorities. 
The book would also be a good choice for seminars in law and society and in 
law and politics, for institutions that offer these courses. In short, this is great 
stuff for readers at every level. But tort junkies starved for more discussion of 
gender and race will find it particularly irresistible.
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